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This study explores the empirical relationships between GHG emissions and an extensive
range of business performance measures for UK FTSE-350 listed ﬁrms over the ﬁrst decade
or so of such reporting. Despite the popular and policy generated environmental imper-
atives over this perioddalong with growing evidence of the corporate added-value of
having an ‘environmental conscience’, voluntary disclosure of emissions has been slow to
adopt by ﬁrms. The leading contribution is to present clear evidence of a non-linear
relationship, initially increasing with ﬁrm performance and then decreasing. An exten-
sive pattern of non-reporting of emissions is also observed over time, and prior literature
has introduced questions of endogeneity existing between ﬁrm performance and emis-
sions. Steps are taken to ensure conﬁdence/robustness of the results to these concerns.
Accordingly, a two-stage (Heckman-type) selection model is used to analyse the
emissions-performance nexus conditional upon the ﬁrm choosing to report (i.e. treating
the choice to report as being endogenously determined with ﬁrm performance). From
thisdin addition to conﬁrming the robustness of the non-linear relationshipdit can be
observed that the decision to report emissions is not directly inﬂuenced by wider social/
governance disclosure attitudes of a ﬁrm, thus suggesting that ﬁrms disassociate envi-
ronmental responsibility from social responsibility.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since before climate change had become a recurring central policy issue there has been a long-standing research
imperative to better understand the relationship between pollutant emissions and economic activities. Hitherto, empirical
investigation into the relationship between activity and emissions has been conducted at the household-level (see, for
example,Cox, Collins, Woods, & Ferguson, 2012; Kahn, 1998), but more extensively at the sectoral and economy-wide level
(see, for example, the considerable range of such studies surveyed in Dinda, 2004; Nahman & Antrobus, 2005 and Stern,Finance, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong.
(D.C. Broadstock).
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D.C. Broadstock et al. / The British Accounting Review xxx (2017) 1e1222004). With the exception of Konar and Cohen (2001) (who analyse the relationship between U.S. toxic chemical release data
and stock market value), and Wen-Hsin Hsu and Wang (2013) (who analyse the impact of U.S. mandatory greenhouse gas
reductions on stock market value), relatively little methodologically comparable research, nor similarly extensive and direct
investigation of emissions exists at the ﬁrm-speciﬁc level. More indirectly, however, there are many studies framed in terms
of analysing environmental management activities, environmental innovation, technology adoption and other environmental
performance measures, alongside participation in particular environmental programmes requiring mandatory or voluntary
compliance (see, for example, Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Carrion-Flores& Innes, 2010; Cole, Elliott,& Shimamoto, 2006;
Frondel, Horbach, & Rennings, 2008; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Wagner, 2010; Wagner, Van Phu, Wehrmeyer, & Azomahou,
2002). Horvathova (2010) undertakes an extensive review of this work and reports on a meta-regression of 64 outcomes
from 37 empirical studies in the “ﬁrm-environmental performance nexus” and ﬁnds,Pleas
form
j.bar.“ …. that the likelihood of ﬁnding a negative link between EP (environmental performance) and FP (ﬁnancial perfor-
mance) signiﬁcantly increases when using the correlation coefﬁcients and portfolio studies. On the other hand, the use
of multiple regressions and panel data technique has no effect on the outcome. This suggests that it is important to
account for omitted variable biases such as unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity. The results also suggest that appropriate
time coverage is important in order to establish a positive link between EP and FP. This suggests that it takes time for
environmental regulation to materialise in ﬁnancial performance.” p.56.Horvathova’s (2010) review also seems to point to a paucity of robust, extensive empirical GHG emissions-performance
studies over a reasonable time frame at the ﬁrm-level. This is despite numerous lobby group, media and Government
policy-led exhortations to, and initiatives for, ﬁrms to reduce their level of GHG emissions. These are generally framed as parts
of various concerted actions to combat climate change and encourage permanent adoption of more environmentally sus-
tainable modes of production.
Thus, this study explores the empirical relationship between a very extensive range of the most typically reported and
deployed business performance measures and reported GHG emissions (all readily accessible via the Bloomberg (2016)
database) for UK FTSE-350 listed ﬁrms over the period 2000 to the end of 2015.
The main contribution of this study lies in the clear evidence of a non-linear relationship between ﬁrm performance and
emissions, with the effect initially increasing with ﬁrm performance and then decreasing after ﬁrm performance reaches a
certain level. This conclusion is subjected to scrutiny, and after controlling for various factors that may be deemed to inﬂuence
the result, is shown to be robust. Speciﬁcally, it is acknowledged that there is more than oneway tomeasure performance, and
after testing various alternatives, it is seen that this itself does not change the core conclusions. Further it is possible, as
suggested in some prior research, that ﬁrm performance and emissions might be endogenously related. Data limitations do
not make it easy to adopt traditional instrumental variable techniques; therefore, an endogenous selection model is used
instead (treating the decision to report as the key endogenous step) that does not eliminate the non-linear effects. Additional
explorations using the so-called ‘special regressor’ method due to Lewbel (2012), which adopts a non-standard IV approach
using synthetic instruments, again fails to dismiss the existence of non-linear effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background to the basis, advantages
and limitations of the most common business performance indicators used. A brief retrospect on the guiding theoretical and
empirical literature pertaining to emission-ﬁrm performance linkages is then presented which informs the choice of key
hypotheses investigated. Then an attempt is made to distil these key concepts and direct them towards an underpinning
theoretical framework to inform the subsequent empirical work. Data issues and the modelling strategy employed are
considered in the following two sections. The results are then presented and discussed with a summary of ﬁndings and some
concluding remarks proffered in the ﬁnal section.
2. Measuring performance
It is important to consider a comprehensive range of different acceptedmeasures of performance, as businesses havemany
stakeholders (such as shareholders, bankers, employees, and tax authorities) whose interests in the ﬁrm differ (Johnston &
Pongatichat, 2008). Shareholders, for instance, may focus more on proﬁts, whilst bankers focus on both cash-ﬂow-related
performance metrics, such as operating cash ﬂows and capital structure. On the contrary, tax authorities may focus on
proﬁt before tax and employees on sales. Besides, accounting policies (e.g. depreciation method) or differences on capital
structure or ﬁnancing decisions (e.g. leasing) induce performance asymmetries in the short run that necessitate the need to
account for alternative performance measures. The broad range of business performance measures used in this study are
Sales, Net Income, Operating Proﬁts, Market Capitalisation, Stock price, Asset, ROE (Return on Equity), Tobin's Q and EBITDA
(Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization). Deﬁnitions and a brief explanation of the examinedmeasures are
set out in Table 1.
2.1. Firm performance and polluting emissions: A brief theoretical retrospect
The analysis of pollution by ﬁrms has a long and distinguished history and its chronological context is set out in Kula
(1998) and Pearce (2002). Early contributions set out what has emerged to serve as a very durable stylized picture of a
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm treating the atmosphere and other environmental media, such as seas and river basins, as essentiallye cite this article in press as: Broadstock, D. C., et al., Voluntary disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions and business per-
ance: Assessing the ﬁrst decade of reporting, The British Accounting Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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consumed by such ﬁrms to the material detriment of other ﬁrms and households, which would be expected to become
manifest in terms of the external costs (negative externality) of pollution being imposed on others through clean-up costs,
deleterious health effects etc. Such simple stylized thinking, supplemented by analyses of property rights (see, for example,
Coase, 1960; Dales, 1968) has informed the structuring and application by environmental regulators of a range of command
and control instruments (total bans, emission standards, ﬁnes) as well as of economic incentive instruments (taxes, subsidies,
tradable permits); for an overview see Baumol and Oates (1988). These were intended to reduce or optimize the level of
polluting emissions and were justiﬁed with reference to various measures or indicators of societal preferences. In principle,
however, such regulatory interventions would still need to be mindful of the neoclassical economic implication of proﬁt
maximization that ﬁrms would only expend the minimum cost necessary to comply with any given regulatory intervention
and even weigh up the net cost implications of bypassing such interventions if monitoring, enforcement and punishment
were weak.
Another theoretical strand, however, drawing initially and principally on case study evidence, recasts this body of theory
premised on the assertion that increasing regulatory stringency may actually be proﬁtable rather than costly (Porter, 1991;
Porter & van der Linde, 1995). This argument, generally labelled ‘the Porter hypothesis’ is explained in terms of the stim-
ulus to innovation afforded by tighter mandatory environmental regulations prompting cost-saving productive efﬁciencies.
The conceptual and empirical basis for the hypothesis has been contested and augmented for testing in ‘weak’, ‘narrow’ and
‘strong’ forms (see, for example, Ambec, Cohen, Elgie, & Lanoie, 2013; Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; Lanoie, Laurent-Lucchetti,
Johnstone, & Ambec, 2011; Palmer et al., 1995). In weak form it is simply asserted that environmental regulations can
stimulate innovation. The narrow form suggests that ﬂexible environmental policy regimes can better incentivise innovation
than less ﬂexible environmental policy regimes and the strong form suggests that well designed regulation can induce cost-
saving innovations outweighing the costs of compliance with such regulations.
In a related vein, further theoretical strands of the ﬁrm-pollution emission discourse have also explored the motivations
and scope for actually fostering voluntary over-compliancee i.e. abating emissions someway above theminimum (statutory)
requirement (Anton, Deltas, & Khanna, 2004; Arora & Gangopadhyay, 1995). The very existence of this practice might appear
to pose a serious challenge to neoclassical economic conceptions of ﬁrm practice. This arises since the required information to
voluntarily indicate or demonstrate over-compliance entails (i) disclosure of potentially strategically valuable information to
competitors and regulators and (ii) voluntarily incurring the costs of collecting the emissions information. At the very least,
such economic theorymight be recalled to support the view that the practicewould not bewidespread and perhaps related to
distinct competitive environmental strategies where signalling ‘green’ or climate change combative credentials offer ‘legit-
imacy’ (see, for example, Cho & Patten, 2007) or has market value. Indeed in some other theoretical studies voluntary over-
compliance has simply been conceptualized as exercises in ‘greenwash’ i.e. simply augmenting marketing spend (see, for
example, Kim & Lyon, 2011; Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, & LaGore, 2013).
In other cases the undertaking of voluntary over-compliance has simply been related to differences in regulatory strin-
gency across countries and thereby offering, for example, some foreign direct investing ﬁrms competitive advantages by
default, simply through their experience in their host country. Essentially, if regulatory stringency is expected to be on an
upward trajectory in the country being invested in, then this intrinsic competitive advantage could be reinforced via green
branding and marketing tactics and also accentuated as domestic ﬁrms struggle (in cost terms) to comply with tougher
regulations. However, over-compliance may also arise for both foreign direct investing and domestic ﬁrms due to a desire to
exploit cost-saving efﬁciency improvements that raise resource productivity by the ﬁrm, i.e. leading to the generation of less
waste or emissions per unit of natural resource inputs used in production. This may emerge from resource productivity
improvements in the mainstream production process of the ﬁrm or the greater use of the waste by-products in new or other
production lines. Nevertheless, it remains an open empirical question in different market contexts, whether or not more
efﬁcient ﬁrms spend more or less on pollution abatement than less efﬁcient ﬁrms. For instance, there are conspicuous
contrasts in the efﬁciency-pollution abatement spending relationship for the UK metal manufacturing and chemical in-
dustries presented in Collins and Harris (2002 and 2005).
At the heart of this question lies an extensive related thread of literature concerned with establishing the veracity or
otherwise of the ‘Jevons Paradox’ and its more contemporary evocation as ‘the rebound effect’ (see, for example, Saunders,
1992; Turner & Hanley, 2011). Jevons conjectured that technological progress leading to greater resource productivity (in
his context, more efﬁcient use of coal) actually provided the scope and means for increasing coal demand. Saunders (1992)
assessed the gains speciﬁcally from energy resource efﬁciency within the context of various economic growth assumptions
and found that some level of rebound effect was present. The idea that energy resource efﬁciency may actually be a less
environmentally successful strategy than commonly thought has provided a source of ﬁerce academic contention centring on
the extent to which energy efﬁciency improvements in some individual ﬁrms and markets are technically connected to
sectoral and economy-wide energy resource consumption.
Among the extant literature there also features a voluminous number of studies focusing on a conjecture termed the
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). This literature postulates with various implicit and/or explicit assumptions and condi-
tions that the rate of emissions reduces with the scale of activity, but, moreover, after a certain level of activity, that the level of
emissions may also reduce in absolute terms (Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang, & Wheeler, 2002; Dinda, 2005; Kijima, Nishide, &
Ohyama, 2010).Please cite this article in press as: Broadstock, D. C., et al., Voluntary disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions and business per-
formance: Assessing the ﬁrst decade of reporting, The British Accounting Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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Table 1
Measures of business performance and capital structure.
Measure Variable name Deﬁnition and Explanation
Money metric based performance measures
Sales (also called Turnover) SALES Direct measure of business performance, because indicates business generating
activity, and emission generating activity
EBITDA ‘Earnings Before Interest Tax
Depreciation and Amortization
EBITDA Operating Proﬁts before the deduction of non-cash items Depreciation and
Amortization. Company performance measure. EBITDA margin is a measure of
the proﬁtability and short-term company performance.
Net Income, also known as After tax Proﬁts PROFITS Proﬁt of the ﬁrm, after Tax deductions. Important for shareholders because a
proportion of Net Income is given to shareholders as dividends.
Operating Proﬁts, is also known as Earnings
Before Interest and Tax.
OPROF Proﬁts before interest and taxation. Proxy of company performance, and proxy
of company's operating cash ﬂows.
Market Capitalisation is the value of the ﬁrm in
capital markets.
MCAP Market Capitalisation is the number of shares outstanding times the share price.
Measure of value and hence performance independent of the ﬁrms' accounting
policy. Measure of the company size, as well.
Asset, denotes the Total Assets at the end of the
period.
ASSETS Measure of the size of the ﬁrm.
Ratio based performance measures/measures that cannot be scaled by number of staff
Stock price PRICE Reﬂects company performance as evaluated by the shareholders, scaled by the
number of shares.
ROE - Return on Equity ROE Net Income over Average Equity. Average Equity denotes the average Equity
during a Fiscal Year. It is a measure of proﬁtability from the perspective of the
Shareholders.
Tobin's Q TOBQ Market Value of the company over the Replacement Value of its assets. Tobin Q
over Total Assets is indication of long-term performance
D.C. Broadstock et al. / The British Accounting Review xxx (2017) 1e124Contradictory evidence has been found afﬁrming and disputing the presence of environmental Kuznets curves at different
levels of aggregation (see, for example, Bertinelli & Strobl, 2005; Chimeli & Braden, 2005; Dinda, 2004; Fernandez, Perez, &
Ruiz, 2012; Millimet, List, & Stengos, 2003; Perman & Stern, 2003). Nevertheless, some extension of this thinking into the
corporate sectormight have been expected to systematically investigate the potentialwidespread (cross-sectoral) existence of
such curveswith respect toGHGs at theﬁrm-level, even thoughmoredifﬁcult questions do arise as to the appropriate choice of
a particular activitymeasure. In the related literature at themacro, sectoral andhousehold level, income is generallyused as the
measure of activity. However, it would be reasonable to assert that business performance metrics are the more appropriate
activity indicator at the ﬁrm level. Firms who perform better have arguably greater ﬂexibility to invest in emissions-reducing
activities, noting that these are sometimes both high upfront cost investments as well as low direct return investments.
Firms that are not performing so well will have less ﬁnancial scope to take such emission abating actions. However,
measuring performance is itself a difﬁcult task, and arguably there is no clear single speciﬁc measure of performance for a
ﬁrm. The main reason for this is that ﬁrms have different stakeholders who are interested in different objectives, and also that
multinational ﬁrms may well have similar stakeholders from different geographic regions that may well place more or less
importance on the same objectives.
2.2. Towards an underpinning theory of corporate environmental Kuznets curves
In light of the theoretical and empirical discourse outlined and discussed in the previous section, we distil some key
concepts that may maybe be harnessed to support the beginnings of an underpinning theory to help explain corporate
environmental Kuznets curves. This theory is situated in the business performance-emissions nexus and used to advance
three simple but key hypotheses warranting empirical investigation.
The most fundamental key concept (based on the ﬁrst and second laws of thermodynamics) is that there is always a clear
positive relationship in industrial production between the generation of outputs (goods) and the generation of emissions/
waste (bads). For a given ﬁrm's plants, the exact proportion of ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ is an open empirical question premised on (i)
the technical efﬁciency of production and (ii) the degree to which emission and waste costs are effectively internalised to the
ﬁrm. A lower proportion of ‘bads’ implies higher resource productivity (output/resource inputs [Y/R]) contributing to cost
reduction in the ﬁrm. For ‘reasonable’ values of (i) and (ii), resource productivity should be positively related to business
performance (p) over some range of output but with diminishing returns setting in thereafter. As such the relationship
between Y/R andpmight be theoretically posited to follow an inverted ‘U’ shaped pattern and thus underpin a similar pattern
in an emission e business performance metric relationship.
To begin to empirically explore the logic and bounds of this simple theoretical framework in the light of voluntary
disclosure of GHG emissions by ﬁrms, we posit the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Firms’ Greenhouse gas emissions are dependent on ﬁrm performance and more speciﬁcally are subject to an
environmental Kuznets-type curve.
Hypothesis 2. Business performance measures are not related to emissions identically.Please cite this article in press as: Broadstock, D. C., et al., Voluntary disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions and business per-
formance: Assessing the ﬁrst decade of reporting, The British Accounting Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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relationship.3. Data
The data are taken from the Bloomberg (2016) database and include all ﬁrms listed in the FTSE 350 index since 2000, and
includes all available data up to the end of 2015. In principle, this data allows for several thousand ﬁrm-year observations,
however, a signiﬁcant amount of non-reporting of emissions among ﬁrms substantially reduces the sample sizes available for
econometric work. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the FTSE 350 data, including measures for the ﬁrms that report
emissions, selected statistics for those that do not report and also for the full sample. These are generally ﬁrmswhose primary
business activity is in the UK, though most of the ﬁrms on the list are multinational ﬁrms, hence, the data encapsulates
exposure to international business practices and standards/regulations.
The main variable of interest is the self-reported level of emissions, which include all greenhouse gas emissions reported
by the business that were created by the activity of the business.1 This includes a basket of gases that includes, but is not
restricted to carbon dioxide emissions. The deﬁnition of business activity is quite general and does potentially incorporate
both direct and indirect emissions, whereby the direct emissions are those which the reporting ﬁrm has direct control over,
and the indirect emissions are those in which the ﬁrm has little or no direct control over, for instance elements of the wider
supply chain.2
4. Modelling strategy
The empirical approach connecting ﬁrm level emissions and the various performance indicators is based upon the type of
models observed in the EKC literature, inwhich themodel allows for a non-linear relationship in the form of a quadratic curve
(see, for example, Kijima et al. (2010). Equation (1) depicts the equation to be estimated:
eit ¼ aþ b1pit þ b2pit2 þ
XI
i¼2
diDi þ
XT
t¼2
dtDt (1)Where e is the greenhouse gas emissions divided by the number of staff, and p is the performance indicator. The per-
formance indicators are of two types, some are money metrics, and others are ratios: the money metric performance
measures (SALES, EBITDA, PROFITS, OPROF, MCAP and ASSETS) are divided by the number of staff, while the remaining
measures (PRICE, ROE and TOBQ) are not. Di and Dt are dummy variables to control for industry speciﬁc and time speciﬁc
effects, where the model intercept a represents the base industry and base time period. Firm speciﬁc ﬁxed effects were
considered, but limitations in data reporting preclude this as being viable. b1 and b2, which are the coefﬁcients describing the
existence and nature of relationship between ﬁrm performance and emissions, are the main parameters of interest.
To provide themost robust estimates possible, and ensure that parameter inference is robust to any heteroskedasticity the
linear equations in (1) are estimated using a non-parametric bootstrap regression. The (residual based) bootstrap procedure
provides inference upon a statistical model by using the ordinary least squares (OLS) residuals to represent the empirical
distribution of shocks. These residuals are recorded, and re-ordered across the observations to allow any given observation to
be subject to a different error, subsequently the model is re-estimated by OLS and the coefﬁcients are recorded as individual
runs of a bootstrap. Thus, the bootstrap process evaluates how stable the estimated coefﬁcients are to different data, where
the differences in data are based on observed (unexplainable) variability. This is in effect the purpose of conventional
(asymptotic) inference, but no longer depends on either normality of the residuals nor large sample sizes. See Davison and
Hinkley (1997); Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and for further detailed discussion of non-parametric regression by least
squares. The results reported in the following section concentrate on the mean coefﬁcient value and the 95% conﬁdence
interval from 1000 bootstrap replications.
4.1. Correcting for self-reporting bias/endogeneity
It is possible that ﬁrm performance and the decision to report emissions are jointly determined, a concern that has been
presented in a number of prior research studies. In such a case, there is a risk that the endogenously determined behaviours
may lead to statistical bias in the estimated parameters, thereby rendering invalid any conclusions drawn from simple OLS1 We appreciate and would like to recognize the valuable suggestion by an anonymous reviewer to explore the European Pollutant Release and Transfer
Register as a potential source of additional data. This very interesting data captures site-level pollutant emissions from around 30,000 plants across Europe,
but unfortunately contains data only from industrial sites, and therefore does not provide sufﬁcient coverage to match many of the ﬁrms included in our
data sample that are drawn from other sectors, and so was not considered further here.
2 There is a possible concern that since ﬁrms have proxy over their reporting standards, they may not report perfectly comparable pollutant levels. There
is no way for this to be conﬁrmed with the available data, though it is assumed that the reporting practices will be, by and large, consistent and hence
comparable across ﬁrms.
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problem. The latent system equations can be written as:
eS*it ¼ aS þ bS1Disclosureit
2 XI XT
eO*it ¼ aO þ bO1pOit þ bO2pOit þ
i¼2
dOi D
O
i þ
t¼2
dOt D
O
t (2)
Where:eOit ¼

0 if eS* ¼ 0
eO*it OtherwiseThat is to say that the emissions for any given ﬁrm are only observed when the selection variable eS*is positive. The
Bloomberg database includes proprietary measures of environmental disclosure (ED), social disclosure (SD) and governance
disclosure (GD), which are a natural choice of instruments for the selection equation:
eS*it ¼ aS þ bS1EDit þ bS2SDit þ bS3GDit4.2. A note on additional alternative estimation procedures
It is common practice in situations where endogeneity is expected to exist, to adopt an instrumental variable (IV)
approach. In IV regressions, the variable expected to be endogenously connected with the outcome of interest, in our case the
measure of ﬁrm-performance, needs to be instrumented using a proxy-variable that exhibits a high correlation with ﬁrm
performance, but a low correlation with the residuals from a standard OLS regression of the emissions model in equation (1).
Finding statistically valid instruments can be a challenging task in many applications, and in the present study it was not
possible to conceive or easily identify valid instruments that would permit traditional IV regressions to be adopted.
Failing to identify a valid instrument does not howevermean that endogeneity bias is not a concern. Recognising that there
are many cases in which valid instruments are difﬁcult to identify, Lewbel (2012) has suggested an innovative new approach
for IV analysis known as known as ‘special regressor’, whereby valid instruments are synthetically generated using the
available and expected endogenous variables. Therefore, no exogenous instruments need to be identiﬁed (although they can
still be included if available). One might extend a degree of scepticism at ﬁrst, since this sounds, in many ways, too good to be
true. However, Lewbel (2012) is well sighted and the approach appears to be gaining traction in econometric research;
furthermore, the work fully develops the relevant asymptotic theories and offers Monte-Carlo evidence to highlight its ac-
curacy/power. The full details of this ‘special regressor’ procedure are not presented here; however, can be found in Lewbel
(2012) and related references.
The ‘special regressor’ model is therefore applied here as another way to handle potential endogeneity effects. This allows
the level of ﬁrm performance (and its square) to be treated as endogenous terms. This approach differs from the Heckman
selection model which instead of modelling the levels of ﬁrm performance, treats the decision to report as endogenous. Thus
results from these two approaches are complementary to each other, exploring different sources/stages of endogenous
relationship.
5. Results and discussion
This section presents and discusses the main results, taking each of the aforementioned hypotheses in turn.
Hypothesis 1. Firms’ Greenhouse gas emissions are dependent on ﬁrm performance and more speciﬁcally are subject to an
environmental Kuznets-type curve. If either of the linear or squared emissions terms is insigniﬁcant, then the Kuznets relationship
can be rejected. This implies the following null hypothesis:
H1ð1Þ : Both b1 and b2s0Tested against the null hypothesis that either one of these are equal to zero. This can be evaluated using individual coefﬁcient
signiﬁcance testing procedures.
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation results for CO2 and GHG emissions respectively based on Equation (1). Across the
columns of these tables it is evident that there is a broad dichotomy between the two types of performance measures. For
each of the alternative money metric based performance measures, with the exception of SALES, give strong evidence of a
non-linear inverted U-shape relationship between performance and emissions. For SALES the coefﬁcient values broadlyPlease cite this article in press as: Broadstock, D. C., et al., Voluntary disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions and business per-
formance: Assessing the ﬁrst decade of reporting, The British Accounting Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Performance measure: Estimation data (reporting ﬁrm-years) All ﬁrm-years Non-reporting ﬁrm-years
means max min sd skew kurtosis observed missing means sd observed missing means sd observed missing
CO2 5179.828 86980 0.323 13586.01 3.477 12.735 688 1775 5179.828 13586.010 688 6257
GHG 2637.018 95119 0.079 9814.267 5.634 36.412 2147 316 2637.018 9814.267 2147 4798
SALES 9523.652 470171 31076 35188.39 8.955 91.977 2444 19 5747.443 25543.222 5667 1278 4682.451 22107.901 669.000 1259.000
EBITDA 1302.949 57301 4240 4516.543 7.51 68.271 2217 246 789.400 3370.052 5176 1769 622.312 2833.134 4565.000 1692.000
PROFITS 776.714 18938.23 0.17 1066.105 6.572 82.063 2438 25 668.413 1584.338 6213 732 661.263 1651.262 5537.000 720.000
OPROF 856.736 43645 10340 3246.32 7.569 72.43 2225 238 513.439 2403.501 5213 1732 408.947 1980.952 4603.000 1654.000
PRICE 776.714 18938.23 0.17 1066.105 6.572 82.063 2438 25 668.413 1584.338 6213 732 661.263 1651.262 5537.000 720.000
MCAP 8110.376 155859.2 0.713 18349.85 4.191 20.136 2438 25 5058.658 14020.305 5520 1425 4066.975 11164.577 4844.000 1413.000
ASSETS 44849 2692538 38.544 214529.6 8.547 83.794 2444 19 25334.536 152070.827 5664 1281 15976.769 86741.402 4995.000 1262.000
ROE 23.268 2409.862 208.894 83.691 15.262 355.123 2423 40 20.363 67.899 5435 1510 18.710 66.192 4776.000 1481.000
TOBQ 1.789 80.938 0.323 2.618 23.32 641.372 2426 37 1.862 2.537 5352 1593 1.884 2.687 4685.000 1572.000
ind_1 0.076 1 0 0.264 3.211 8.314 2463 0 0.056 0.230 6945 0 0.058 0.233 6257.000 0.000
ind_2 0.181 1 0 0.385 1.655 0.741 2463 0 0.173 0.378 6945 0 0.167 0.373 6257.000 0.000
ind_3 0.19 1 0 0.393 1.576 0.484 2463 0 0.153 0.360 6945 0 0.156 0.363 6257.000 0.000
ind_4 0.004 1 0 0.064 15.589 241.106 2463 0 0.002 0.046 6945 0 0.002 0.042 6257.000 0.000
ind_5 0.054 1 0 0.226 3.944 13.562 2463 0 0.060 0.238 6945 0 0.059 0.236 6257.000 0.000
ind_6 0.192 1 0 0.394 1.559 0.432 2463 0 0.305 0.460 6945 0 0.321 0.467 6257.000 0.000
ind_7 0 0 0 0 NA NA 2463 0 0.002 0.046 6945 0 0.002 0.049 6257.000 0.000
ind_8 0.143 1 0 0.35 2.039 2.16 2463 0 0.110 0.313 6945 0 0.103 0.304 6257.000 0.000
ind_9 0.028 1 0 0.165 5.717 30.697 2463 0 0.041 0.198 6945 0 0.043 0.202 6257.000 0.000
Note: SALES, EBITDA, PROFITS, OPROF, MCAP, ASSETS are in million British pounds. ROE in percentage terms, PRICE in British Pounds. CO2 refers to carbon dioxide emissions, and GHG refers to the wider set of
greenhouse gas emissions.
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D.C. Broadstock et al. / The British Accounting Review xxx (2017) 1e128support the idea of an inverted U-shape, however the 95% conﬁdence interval for the quadratic term passes through zero i.e.
the conﬁdence interval includes both positive and negative values, but whose range is predominantly negative. The absolute
values of the coefﬁcients in each of the columns vary, but this is to be expected given the different deﬁnitions of performance.
For the performance measures that are based on ratios, a slightly different picture emerges. The patterns are much less
consistent, with less signiﬁcance visible on the parameter estimates. Nonetheless the U-shape ﬁnding for PRICE stands out
clearly among the various performance measures. Compared with the other performance measures PRICE might be
considered relatively more exogenous to the ﬁrm,3 since stock prices respond to the actions and choices of ﬁnancial analysts
and investors who themselves may factor in information beyond the ﬁrm-speciﬁc fundamentals, such as thewider stability of
the ﬁnancial market and broader economic conditions that will also in part determine the demand for speculative investment
behaviours and in turn a part of PRICE. An interesting implication of this ﬁnding is that environmentally conscious investors
might have a preference towards mid-priced stocks, where ‘mid’ is loosely used here to refer to the region of the optimum on
the U-shaped curve. Taking the results together, the evidence strongly supports the ﬁrst hypothesis stating that emissions are
functionally dependent on ﬁrm performance. Further evidence of a U-shaped relationship can be seen for some of the other
ratio-based performance metrics also, suggesting this is not an incidental ﬁnding.
As discussed, Tables 3 and 4 strongly favour the existence a relationship between emissions and ﬁrm performance does
exist and moreover is broadly in terms of a non-linear Kuznets-type relationship, albeit one that is slightly sensitive to the
deﬁnition of performance. The performance measures considered here have been grouped into two types, based on their
ability to be scaled by the number of ﬁrm employees. The difference between these two groups therefore can be attributed in
part to the scale effect embedded in the per-employee transformation. In light of this the ﬁndings have one rationale being
that when the physical scale of a ﬁrm is taken into account, it is much more likely that a relationship with emissions will be
revealed. A complementary interpretation to this is that the ratio-based performance measures do not take sufﬁcient account
of the physical operations of the ﬁrm and their associated emission rates. Since these latter performance measures are
arguably framedmore towards illuminating ﬁnancial performance/stability than the other measures, then this might indicate
that ﬁnancial stability or instability need not be a justiﬁcation for sustaining yet higher levels of emissions.
Hypothesis 2. Business performance measures are not related to emissions identically.
Each of the performance measures are deﬁned in different metrics, which is a direct result of their unique purposes. For
example, TOBQ is a ratio intended to reﬂect an eclectic snapshot of overall ﬁrm performance and has a fundamentally
differentmetric to SALES, with the latter being expressed in an easy to understandmoneymetric. It stands to reason that their
relationships with emissions should differ. To evaluate this hypothesis requires comparing in someway the same coefﬁcients
from the same model structures, but with different performance measures included on the right hand side. There are a
number of ways that such hypotheses could be formulated, but a pragmatic approach is taken here.
As discussed with regard to the previous hypothesis, there are some substantial differences in how performance measures
of different types are related to emissions. The fact that some illustrates signiﬁcant Kuznet’s-type curves, and others do not, is
sufﬁcient evidence so as to be unable to reject Hypothesis 2. No attempt is made here to reconcile such differences; rather the
purpose here is to highlight their existence. These differences pose interesting concerns for environmental impact man-
agement, inasmuch as ﬁrms pursuing different performance objectives may be reasonably able to justify several alternative
emissions levels as being admissible. Although not a focus of the present paper, it is abundantly clear that to reconcile their
differences is a pressing priority for future study.
Hypothesis 3. Voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions affects the nature of the emissions-business performance
relationship.
This hypothesis is evaluated using the coefﬁcient values from a Heckman-type selection type model which makes corrections for
self-selection into emissions reporting.
The results to this point provide compelling evidence that a ﬁrm-level environmental Kuznet-curve does exist, but that it
can be sensitive to the choice of performancemeasure used. The aim here is to consider the possibility that the conclusions so
far might be sensitive to possible bases that can arise when modelling data involving self-selection (or pre-determined
choices). Table 2 highlights the level of attrition in the dataset regarding the reporting of emissions, with only 688 obser-
vations being available from an initial sample of almost 7000 observations in principle. For the performance measures used,
there is virtually full and complete data either from the stock market or from the mandatory company accounts. Hence, the
level of attrition in reported emissions is due to self-selected non-reporting. In general over the sample period there has been
no speciﬁc requirement on ﬁrms to report their emissions; however, some ﬁrms have chosen to adopt transparency principles
as part of their corporate social responsibility activities. Giving a transparent view of emissions levels potentially serves as a
signal to stakeholders of the integrity of a given ﬁrm, which could in turn generate some intangible added-value for the ﬁrm
in terms of environmental warm-glow and/or customer and investor loyalty. An alternative view is that it simply provides3 We would like to acknowledge here some useful points raised by an anonymous referee. The variable PRICE is among the most encompassing measures
of performance considered in this study, since it reﬂects all dimensions of ﬁrm behavior, from investment and ﬁnancing decisions through to the activities
connected to emissions. However, while it is encompassing as a measure of performance, this alone does not eliminate the inﬂuence of exogenous investor
behavior upon the corporate stock price. A type of exogenous inﬂuence that will be less apparent in many of the other performance measures. Hence
relatively more exogenous.
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Table 3
CO2d95% bootstrap conﬁdence interval in brackets.
Performance
measure:
Money metric performance measures (per employee) Ratio based performance measures
SALES EBITDA PROFITS OPROF MCAP ASSETS PRICE ROE TOBQ
Level term 3.0609 6.7997 6.5639 2.7389 1.5475 0.1842 ¡0.0005 0.0052 0.7492
(2.2626,
3.9508)
(3.8319,
9.8654)
(5.0951,
7.9808)
(-0.4214,
5.7047)
(1.0452,
2.0498)
(0.0511,
0.3104)
(-0.0010,
0.0001)
(0.0001,
0.0113)
(0.1444,
1.3844)
Squared term ¡0.4189 2.4412 ¡2.7026 2.8278 ¡0.1352 ¡0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 ¡0.1026
(-0.6325,
0.2013)
(-4.8815,
0.3686)
(-3.5366,
1.8115)
(-0.4163,
6.7422)
(-0.2140,
0.0485)
(-0.0116,
0.0022)
(0.0000,
0.0000)
(0.0000,
0.0000)
(-0.1899,
0.0095)
Observations 669 611 667 610 667 669 667 659 667
Note: SALES, EBITDA, PROFITS, OPROF, MCAP, ASSETS are in million British pounds. ROE in percentage terms, PRICE in British Pounds.
Bold is used to indicate when the highlighted coefﬁcient is constant i.e. when the upper and lower bounds of the conﬁdence interval take the same sign.
Table 4
Greenhouse gasesd95% bootstrap conﬁdence interval in brackets.
Performance
measure:
Money metric performance measures (per employee) Ratio based performance measures
SALES EBITDA PROFITS OPROF MCAP ASSETS PRICE ROE TOBQ
Level term 0.4111 0.4720 0.1307 0.3882 0.0580 0.0483 0.0001 0.0007 0.0287
(0.3629,
0.4787)
(0.4156,
0.5555)
(0.1005,
0.1726)
(0.3201,
0.4724)
(0.0481,
0.0751)
(0.0408,
0.0595)
(-0.0001,
0.0000)
(-0.0014,
0.0003)
(-0.0679,
0.0169)
Squared term ¡0.0064 ¡0.0190 ¡0.0034 ¡0.0163 ¡0.0005 ¡0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004
(-0.0085,
0.0050)
(-0.0232,
0.0163)
(-0.0046,
0.0026)
(-0.0201,
0.0132)
(-0.0006,
0.0004)
(-0.0005,
0.0003)
(0.0000,
0.0000)
(0.0000,
0.0000)
(-0.0002,
0.0009)
Observations 2132 1931 2122 1940 2122 2132 2122 2122 2119
Note: SALES, EBITDA, PROFITS, OPROF, MCAP, ASSETS are in million British pounds. ROE in percentage terms, PRICE in British Pounds.
Bold is used to indicate when the highlighted coefﬁcient is constant i.e. when the upper and lower bounds of the conﬁdence interval take the same sign.
Table 5
CO2 with control for sample selectiondasymptotic p-value in brackets.
Performance measure: Money metric performance measures (per employee) Ratio based performance measures
SALES EBITDA PROFITS OPROF MCAP ASSETS PRICE ROE TOBQ
Selection equation
Environmental disclosure 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Social disclosure 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.93) (0.63) (0.92) (0.62) (0.92) (0.93) (0.92) (0.92) (0.92)
Governance disclosure ¡0.007 0.002 ¡0.008 0.002 ¡0.008 ¡0.008 ¡0.008 ¡0.007 ¡0.008
(0.04) (0.57) (0.04) (0.65) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Stage 1 observations 3225 3167 3223 3166 3223 3225 3223 3216 3223
Emissions equation
Level term 3.044 6.913 6.715 2.873 1.553 0.167 ¡0.005 0.005 0.761
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.05) (0.07) (0.19) (0.05)
Squared term ¡0.404 ¡2.476 ¡2.720 2.709 ¡0.138 0.006 0.000 0.000 ¡0.103
(0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.19) (0.01) (0.12) (0.24) (0.26) (0.09)
Stage 2 observations 666 608 664 607 664 666 664 657 664
Note: SALES, EBITDA, PROFITS, OPROF, MCAP, ASSETS are in million British pounds. ROE in percentage terms, PRICE in British Pounds.
Bold is used to indicate when the highlighted coefﬁcient is constant i.e. when the upper and lower bounds of the conﬁdence interval take the same sign.
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data or deliberate neglect to measure GHG emissions may be implicitly deemed preferable.
The results of the selection models are reported in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. The results in Tables 5 and 6 compare fairly
closely with Tables 3 and 4, suggesting that the possible concerns that self-selection in to reporting may not be a source of
major bias. Two notable differences come from the lack of signiﬁcance for the PRICE performancemeasure under the selection
model for CO2, although if a 20% signiﬁcance level is seen as acceptable, then the non-linear effect hypothesis still ﬁnds some
support. For the ratio or money-metric based performance measures do continue to present some mild evidence of an
inverted ‘U’ shape relationship. Controlling for the selection bias therefore has some impact on the observed relationship. For
the ratio based performance measures the results are quite similar whether the selection model is used or not. The results for
GHG are qualitatively very similar to those for CO2, with the notable exception that the effects seen for PRICE become strongly
signiﬁcant.
Overall, mitigating against the possible bias incurred from self-selection into emissions reporting, the conﬁdence in the
results is greatly increased, and hence is the conﬁdence in the existence of a ﬁrm-level Kuznets-type curve. RegardingPlease cite this article in press as: Broadstock, D. C., et al., Voluntary disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions and business per-
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Table 6
Greenhouse gasses with control for sample selectiondasymptotic p-value in brackets.
Performance measure: Money metric performance measures (per employee) Ratio based performance
measures
SALES EBITDA PROFITS OPROF MCAP ASSETS PRICE ROE TOBQ
Selection equation
Environmental disclosure 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Social disclosure 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Governance disclosure 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.19) (0.39) (0.27) (0.39) (0.27) (0.19) (0.27) (0.18) (0.27)
Stage 1 observations 3225 3024 3217 3033 3217 3225 3217 3221 3216
Emissions equation
Level term 0.415 0.478 0.013 0.394 0.059 0.049 0.000 0.009 0.027
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.13) (0.34)
Squared term ¡0.006 ¡0.019 ¡0.004 ¡0.017 ¡0.000 ¡0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.75) (0.27) (0.44)
Stage 2 observations 2118 1917 2110 1926 2110 2118 2110 2114 2109
Note: SALES, EBITDA, PROFITS, OPROF, MCAP, ASSETS are in million British pounds. ROE in percentage terms, PRICE in British Pounds.
Bold is used to indicate when the highlighted coefﬁcient is constant i.e. when the upper and lower bounds of the conﬁdence interval take the same sign.
Table 7
‘Special regressor’ estimation results for CO2 (p-value in brackets).
Performance measure: Money metric performance measures (per employee) Ratio based performance measures
SALES EBITDA PROFITS OPROF MCAP ASSETS PRICE ROE TOBQ
Level term 0.5965 13.7969 1.5646 0.0528 0.0249 0.0726 N/A ¡2.4935 50.3360
(0.00) (0.08) (0.22) (0.98) (0.95) (0.37) (0.05) (0.85)
Squared term ¡0.0756 ¡8.7969 0.5671 0.8195 0.0065 0.0011 N/A 0.0026 40.7240
(0.00) (0.09) (0.21) (0.64) (0.91) (0.59) (0.14) (0.38)
Observations 669 611 667 610 667 669 667 659 667
Note: SALES, EBITDA, PROFITS, OPROF, MCAP, ASSETS are in million British pounds. ROE in percentage terms, PRICE in British Pounds. The model for PRICE
could not be estimated, and hence no results are reported.
Bold is used to indicate when the highlighted coefﬁcient is constant i.e. when the upper and lower bounds of the conﬁdence interval take the same sign.
Table 8
‘special regressor’ estimation results for Greenhouse gasses (p-value in brackets).
Performance measure: Money metric performance measures (per employee) Ratio based performance measures
SALES EBITDA PROFITS OPROF MCAP ASSETS PRICE ROE TOBQ
Level term N/A 0.1720 0.0119 0.0589 0.0090 0.0090 N/A ¡2.8896 ¡109.4936
(0.00) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Squared term N/A ¡0.0067 0.0004 ¡0.0025 0.0001 ¡0.0001 N/A ¡0.0010 1.0481
(0.00) (0.12) (0.09) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
Observations 2132 1931 2122 1940 2122 2132 2122 2122 2119
Note: SALES, EBITDA, PROFITS, OPROF, MCAP, ASSETS are in million British pounds. ROE in percentage terms, PRICE in British Pounds. The models for SALES
and PRICE could not be estimated, and hence no results are reported.
Bold is used to indicate when the highlighted coefﬁcient is constant i.e. when the upper and lower bounds of the conﬁdence interval take the same sign.
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performance and emissions. Broadly speaking though, the evidence is not strong enough to suggest the EKC does not exist at
the ﬁrm level.
Lastly, Tables 7 and 8 report estimation results for the ‘special regressor’ method that adopts the synthetic instrumental
variables approach to handle endogeneity. The results from these additional regressions should perhaps be taken with a
degree of caution. For both CO2 and GHG emissions, it is not possible to ﬁnd a working speciﬁcation when using PRICE as the
performance measure. For GHG emissions it is also not possible to ﬁnd a reasonable working speciﬁcation when the per-
formance measure is SALES. Notwithstanding these points, the results are largely supportive of the conclusions reported
above. That is to say that the results reinforce the identiﬁed non-linear relationship.
For CO2 emissions, the ‘special regressor’ framework tends to reveal less conﬁdent results, with more insigniﬁcant co-
efﬁcients than in the previous approaches, but for SALES and EBITDA performance measures, the non-linear effect is clearly
visible. For GHG emissions on the other hand the evidence is more deeply compelling, suggesting strong signiﬁcance for
almost all variables scaled per-employee, and also for the performancemeasures deﬁned in level terms.While the signs of thePlease cite this article in press as: Broadstock, D. C., et al., Voluntary disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions and business per-
formance: Assessing the ﬁrst decade of reporting, The British Accounting Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.bar.2017.02.002
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would however be difﬁcult to pin down with any concreteness whether the results in Tables 7 and 8 are in any manner
superior to those in the previous tables, since they reﬂect a method controlling for different styles/sources of endogeneity.
Irrespective of some quantitative differences, the signiﬁcance of the additional results in Tables 7 and 8 (as well as Tables 5
and 6) in validating or vilifying the previously suggested qualitative conclusions are beyond reproach. Efforts to try to dismiss
the observed non-linear relationship between ﬁrm performance and emissions as being a statistical artefact arising from a
failure to control for endogeneity have not proved successful. In this regard, the main contribution of this paper to test the
hypothesis/existence of a potential corporate environmental Kuznets curve provides strong evidence in favour of its
existence.
6. Summary and concluding remarks
The aim of this paper has been to examine the extent of UK ﬁrms’ emissions reporting over the ﬁrst decade of the 21st
century and to test whether ﬁrm performance and emissions levels are related to each other. Additionally whether the kinds
of functional relationships discussed in the empirical environmental literature have some validity at the ﬁrm level are
considered. A wide range of performance measures are considered, to help validate the generality of the conclusions, as well
as two deﬁnitions of emissions CO2 and the more encompassing measure of GHG. The measures are split into two types:
money metric performance measures such as PROFITS or ASSETS, and ratio based performance measures such as ROE and
TOBQ. A clear inverted U-shape is found when benchmarking against money metric based performance measures, while the
evidence is less strong when using ratio based performance measures. These patterns are consistent across both types of
emissions considered, albeit stronger for CO2 than GHG, and are also robust to possible biases that might arise from self-
reporting.
To some degree the results pose questions regarding the role of environmental performancemanagement and the possible
conﬂict that may arise from environmental targets that can be potentially benchmarked against a range of alternative
business performance measures. A more speciﬁc quandary emerging from the analysis, deserving of future study, relates to
the apparent sensitivity of the results to money-metric versus ratio based measures of ﬁrm performance. TOBQ could
arguably conﬂate several aspects of performance, making it more difﬁcult for a stable result to emerge using this measure, but
other ratios such as ROE are more difﬁcult to defend. The results imply one of two things, either these performance measures
share no relation with emissions, or on the other hand, maybe a relationship does exist, but is non-linear of a higher order
than a simple inverted U-shape can handle. Both options are worth exploring further, though perhaps the former holds
greater weight, since these twomeasures in particular are arguably more uniquely connected to the ﬁnancial wealth of a ﬁrm,
whereas the other performancemeasuresmore closely reﬂect, to a greater or lesser degree, the physical operations whichwill
ultimately be the source of the emissions.
One limitation of this study resides in its partial focus. It would be interesting to try and say more regarding the economic
signiﬁcance and value of reporting, but this study explored only one side of the cost-beneﬁt structure of the problem. More
precisely the analysis here offers supporting evidence that the beneﬁts of reporting domaterially exist, albeit exhibiting some
systematic non-linearities making the ‘value’ dampen under certain conditions. However there is no attempt to elaborate on
the costs imposed/incurred from reporting. To this end, and like many studies preceding this one, only a partial picture of the
topic is presented. Further research should do more to examine the cost implications. Only by accounting for the costs of
reporting/audits/due diligence, as well as identifying the costs of emissions reduction activities, will it be possible to say with
conﬁdence something about the true economic value of reporting. Incidentally, and adopting a revealed-preference type view
of the world, a simple logic argues that for reporting to occur, some value must exist, the main question should arguably then
be about the size of the economic value, and not so much about its existence.References
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